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Abstract 
In the Remember-Know paradigm whether a Know response is defined as a high-
confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across 
researchers and can influence participants’ responses.  The current experiment was designed to 
explore differences between the states of Know and Familiar.  Participants studied others’ 
justification statements to ‘Know’ recognition decisions and separated them into two types.  
Crucially, participants were not provided definitions of Know and Familiar on which to sort the 
items – their judgments were based solely on the phenomenology described in the justifications.  
Participants’ sorting decisions were shown to reliably map onto expert classification of Know and 
Familiar.  Post-task questionnaire responses demonstrated that both the level of memory detail and 
confidence expressed in the justifications were central to how participants categorised the items.  
In sum, given no instructions to do so, participants classify Familiar and Know according to two 
dimensions: confidence and amount of information retrieved.   
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Dual-process accounts of recognition memory posit that recognition can be achieved 
through recollection of specific contextual information or evaluation of familiarity.  Such a theory 
places emphasis on subjective experience, as in the Remember-Know (RK) paradigm where items 
are categorised as Remember when something that was thought or experienced at the time of 
encoding is retrieved and as Know without the recall of such associated information (Tulving, 
1985).  An unresolved issue is how Remember and Know responses map onto the processes of 
recollection and familiarity.  While some view the states of Remembering and Knowing as 
orthogonal to the processes of recollection and familiarity (e.g., Gardiner, 2000; Wixted & Mickes, 
2010), many RK studies assume that the two categories map directly onto the two underlying 
processes (Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012; Yonelinas, 2002).  A related issue is whether other 
experiential states can be identified.  Whilst the addition of a Guess response option is now 
common (Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002; Gardiner, 2008), conceptualization of Know 
varies greatly across experiments and interpretation of Know responses has been called “the most 
vexatious problem in the remember/know paradigm” (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, p. 
238).  This problem is the focus of the current study.   
The multi-dimensional nature of Know responses is evident from recognition justification 
statements. Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998) analysed the content of 270 
justifications of Remember, Know, and Guess responses.  Compared to Remember justifications, 
Know justifications were shorter and were absent of contextual details; but included feelings of 
familiarity, ‘just knowing’, thinking a word occurred, or comments on the absence of details.  In 
the current experiment, participants were presented with these Know justifications and their task 
was to examine differences within them
1
. 
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The issue of whether Know responses contain contextual information has been investigated 
with source memory paradigms.  Some studies have shown source retrieval for Know to only be at 
chance (e.g., Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006) while other studies have 
shown source accuracy to be above chance for Know items (e.g., Meiser & Sattler, 2007; Starns & 
Hicks, 2005).  Additionally, Meiser, Sattler, and Weißer (2008) demonstrated that while RK 
source accuracy can be equated in a quantitative way, there remains a qualitative difference 
whereby Remember retrieval involves more specific and integrated memory for episodic details 
than does Know retrieval.  The variability in what is retrieved from memory when a Know 
response is made may be key to understanding the subjective experience and processes associated 
with that retrieval.   
In the RK paradigm, how non-recollective experiences are defined to participants also 
varies.  As shown in Table 1, some researchers include both familiarity and confidence within one 
response option, others emphasize either familiarity or confidence, and yet others ask participants 
to make Remember-Familiar judgments instead of Remember-Know – reasoning that there could 
be confusion between colloquial understanding of ‘knowing’ and its experimental definition.  
Geraci, McCabe and Guillory (2009) compared different Know definitions.  When confidence was 
emphasised, Remember-Know judgments differed across words and non-words whereas Sure-
Unsure judgments did not.  However, when confidence was not emphasised in the Know 
definition, patterns were similar for Remember-Know and Sure-Unsure.  Thus how subjective 
states are defined can have important implications for interpretation of RK responses, particularly 
with regard to the relationship between subjective experience and confidence.   
[Table 1 about here] 
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Using separate Know and Familiar response options, researchers have demonstrated 
different patterns of recognition for Know and Familiar items (Barber, Rajaram, & Marsh, 2008; 
Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997; Dewhurst, Conway, & Brandt, 2009; 
Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Wright & Sladden, 2003).  These findings suggest that people can 
differentiate Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in memory tasks according to definitions 
provided by researchers and support the idea that more than one type of non-recollective 
subjective state of awareness could contribute to recognition (e.g., McCabe, Geraci, Boman, 
Sensenig, & Rhodes, 2011).  However, separation of Know and Familiar response options is not 
common and how people appreciate the differences between these experiential states is not known.  
We tested whether people can differentiate these experiential states when no definitions are 
provided. 
Previously we gave participants definitions of Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess and 
asked them to make judgments about the subjective experience and confidence expressed in 
others’ justification statements (Williams, Conway, & Moulin, 2013).  We divided Gardiner et 
al.’s (1998) Know justifications into those that reflected a feeling of familiarity and those that 
reflected a feeling of knowing (based on the definitions provided in Table 2).  Know justifications 
received higher confidence ratings than did Familiar justifications (Experiment 1); and when the 
intrinsic confidence expressed in the justification was manipulated, Know justifications were not 
consistently assigned to the Know category while assignment of Familiar justifications to Familiar 
was unaffected (Experiment 2).   
[Table 2 about here] 
The aim of the current experiment was to test whether non-experts could observe 
differences between statements reflecting a Know subjective experience and a Familiar subjective 
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experience.  Crucially, here participants were not asked to match the justification to a category 
based on experimental definitions, instead participants were simply asked to split the Gardiner et 
al. (1998) Know justifications into two types.  This methodological change is key: previous 
research has either examined whether changes in definitions influence RK responses in a 
recognition task (Geraci et al., 2009), or has provided definitions of Know and Familiar for use 
when categorising others’ justifications (Williams et al., 2013).  However, Know and Familiar 
definitions may constrain responses – participants may merely assess the justifications in terms of 
how closely they match the provided definition.  Our focus in the current experiment was on 
whether people can detect different experiential states simply from how these states are expressed 
in memory reports, without any constraints imposed by experimenter-written definitions.  
Participants first sorted Know justification statements into two types.  A subsequent questionnaire 
asked what criteria participants had based their categorisations on.  Given that different 
information and epistemic feelings that come to mind during retrieval are associated with the 
subjective states of knowing and finding familiar, it was predicted that participants would be able 
to recognise those mnemonic processes in others’ memory reports and identify different 
justifications that reflect different experiential states.    
Method 
Participants 
Fifty psychology students (41 female) from the University of Leeds aged between 18 and 
35 received participation credit for taking part.  Participants were tested in groups of between two 
and ten.  One participant’s data were excluded for non-compliance with instructions.   
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Materials and procedure 
Stimuli were the 90 Know justification statements from Gardiner et al. (1998)
2
 where 
participants had categorised recognised items as Remember, Know, or Guess.  Their definition of 
Know emphasizes both certainty, ‘knew for a fact’, and familiarity, ‘familiar in the experimental 
context’. In previous research we had expertly categorised the Gardiner et al. justifications as 
either Familiar (n = 43) or Know (n = 47); inter-rater reliability = .82, see Williams et al. (2013).  
Each cue word and its justification statement were printed on an individual card.  
Participants were instructed that: “…on a previous memory test participants had said yes, they 
recognised that cue word, and the justification on the card is the reason they gave for why they 
thought they recognised that cue word”.  Each participant received a set of cards and was 
instructed that we were interested in whether they could differentiate between two types of 
memory justification statement.  Participants were instructed to read the statements and sort them 
into Type A and Type B along whatever criteria they thought the statements differed.  Participants 
were instructed to place Type A cards in one pile and Type B cards in another pile, check that they 
were happy with their sorting decisions, and write ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’ on each card.  
Participants then completed a questionnaire concerning what criteria they had used to make their 
sorting decisions. 
Results 
The relationship between expert and participant categorisation of items was calculated 
using the discrimination measure d’.  Since participants were not initially provided with definitions 
of Know and Familiar it was not known whether a participant considered Type A or Type B to 
map onto ‘Know’ (or ‘Familiar’).  Mapping was calculated based on each participant’s majority 
response.  For example, if the highest number of items a participant had grouped together was 
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Know items, and they had labelled this pile ‘Type A’, then for this participant their label of Type 
A was assumed to map onto Know (and Type B was assumed to map onto Familiar).  On the other 
hand, if the highest number of items a participant had grouped together was Familiar items, and 
they had labelled this pile ‘Type A’, then for this participant their label of Type A was assumed to 
map onto Familiar (and Type B was assumed to map onto Know). 
Using majority mapping of Type A and Type B labels onto Know and Familiar definitions, 
mean d’ was .82 (SD = .49), which was significantly above chance (zero), t(48) = 11.64, p < .001, 
d = 1.67, indicating that the association between expert and participant classification was reliable.  
In terms of the proportion of items this represents, .65 (SD = .10) of items participants categorised 
as Know were expert-classified Know items and .67 (SD = .12) of items participants categorised as 
Familiar were Familiar items, both significantly above chance (.50), both p’s < .001, d’s > 1.41.  
Participants separated the items into two categories that had a similar distribution of items to the 
expert categorisation of Know and Familiar.   
As participants were not given any instruction regarding equal pile size, the size of the two 
piles differed across participants (Know items: min. = 19, max. = 79, mean = 55.  Familiar items: 
min. = 11, max. = 71, mean = 35).  Using c as a measure of biased clustering, for participants who 
had a larger set of Know items (n = 31; Mean c = -.66, SD = .33), proportion correct for Know (M 
= .60, SD = .05) was significantly lower than proportion correct for Familiar (M = .69, SD = .13), 
t(30) = 4.93, p < .001, d = 0.91.  For participants who had a larger set of Familiar items (n = 10; 
Mean c = .48, SD = .30), proportion correct for Know (M = .76, SD = .14) was significantly higher 
than proportion correct for Familiar (M = .60, SD = .07), t(7) = 6.00, p < .001, d = 1.45.  For 
participants whose sets of Know and Familiar were approximately equal (n = 8; Mean c = -.02, SD 
= .04), proportion correct for Know (M = .70, SD = .09) was higher than proportion correct for 
DIFFERENTIATING KNOWING AND FAMILIARITY USING A SORTING TASK   9 
Familiar (M = .66, SD = .10); this difference was also significant, t(9) = 5.38, p = .001, d = 0.42, 
but was numerically much smaller than the differences shown by participants who had 
demonstrated biased clustering.  Thus, for participants who showed a bias towards either Know or 
Familiar items, the proportion of items correctly categorised was higher for items in their smaller 
grouping.  This suggests that participants’ interpretations of what experiential states were 
expressed in these fewer items were more consistent, and these items were more similar (to each 
other), than those placed in the larger grouping.  We suggest that perhaps participants trusted their 
interpretations more for the justifications that made up the smaller group, and that some of the 
items assigned to the ‘other’ category were items they were not sure how to interpret. 
Finally participants completed a questionnaire about the criteria they had used to sort the 
items.  Firstly, on a scale of -2 to +2, participants rated the difficulty of sorting, how similar or 
dissimilar they found the statements, and whether they thought other people would sort the items 
in the same way as them.  One-sample t-tests against the mid-point score of 0 showed that 
participants considered the items somewhat difficult to sort, M = -0.67, SD = 0.85, t(48) = 5.54, p 
< .001, d = -0.79; thought the two types of statements were quite similar, M = 0.47, SD = 0.94, 
t(48) = 3.50, p = .001, d = 0.50; and considered it neither unlikely nor likely that others would sort 
the statements in the same way as them, M = 0.02, SD = 0.95, t < 1. 
Participants then saw a list of possible criteria on which they may have based their sorting 
decisions and selected those used.  Except for ‘gut instinct’ and ‘mainly guessing’, criteria were 
phrased as comparisons, for example, ‘more sure’: I thought that for one Type of memory 
statement the people making the statements sounded more sure of their memories than for the 
other Type of memory statement.  As shown in Table 3, the most common criterion endorsed was 
the above example of ‘more sure’.  Around 50% of participants also thought that for one type of 
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statement people had ‘recalled more information’, a ‘deeper level of processing’, and/or shown 
more ‘confidence’ in their memory performance than the other type of statement.  On average 
participants selected 3.63 criteria (SD = 1.27) from the list of 10 (min. = 1, max. = 7). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Participants were next asked how confident they thought the people who had made the two 
types of statements had been and how much information/how many details the people had 
recalled.  As ‘confidence’ and ‘recalled more information’ were two of the sorting criteria options, 
subsequent analyses examined whether ratings of confidence and detail for Know and Familiar 
items differed depending on endorsement of those criteria; see Figure 1.  Separate 2(endorsement: 
yes/no) x 2(item type: Know/Familiar) ANOVAs were conducted with endorsement as a between-
subjects factor and item type as a within-subjects factor.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
For level of information/details, there was no main effect of endorsement, F < 1, but a 
significant main effect of item type, F(1,47) = 4.39, p = .042, p
2
 = .085, Familiar items were rated 
as containing more information/details than Know items.  This was qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(1,47) = 4.39, p = .042, p
2
 = .085.  Participants who had not endorsed ‘recalled more 
information’ as a criterion did not rate Know and Familiar items as containing different levels of 
information/details, t < 1.  Participants who endorsed ‘recalled more information’ rated Familiar 
items as containing more information/details than Know items, t(26) = 2.84, p = .009, d = 0.98.     
For confidence, there was no main effect of endorsement, F < 1, and no main effect of item 
type, F < 1.  However, the interaction was significant, F(1,47) = 11.13, p = .002, p
2
 = .191.  
Participants who endorsed confidence as a criterion rated Know items as expressing more 
confidence than Familiar items, t(23) = 2.55, p = .018, d = 0.84.  Conversely, participants who had 
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not endorsed confidence as a criterion rated Familiar items as more confident than Know items, 
t(24) = 2.14, p = .043, d = 0.58.  The difference in ratings was larger for participants who had 
endorsed confidence as a sorting criterion
3
; see Figure 1.   
Discussion 
This experiment examined whether participants were able to identify two experiential states 
within what were all originally justification statements to recognised words assigned to Know.  
Participants’ discrimination of Know and Familiar was reliably associated with expert 
categorisation.  However, d’ and the proportion of items that matched expert categorisation were 
not particularly high, demonstrating some divergence between participant and expert 
conceptualisation.  Participants also rated the items as quite similar and somewhat difficult to sort.  
Although people have experience with interpreting their own memory-related experiential states, 
the stimuli used in this task were very short, very subjective in nature, and participants were not 
given any sorting instructions.  Task novelty and subjectivity are reflected in the findings that 
participants considered it neither likely nor unlikely that others would sort the statements in the 
same way as them, and that participants used a variety of criteria to differentiate the statements.  
Discrimination patterns could suggest that at least some participants actually considered the 
justifications to all reflect one type of state of awareness; however, that the sorting decisions were 
reliable supports the conclusion that participants were able to discern differences in the mnestic 
properties of the statements.   
Those participants who endorsed ‘recalled more information’ as a decision criterion rated 
Familiar items as containing more information than Know items.  Without being instructed to use 
‘amount of information’ as a sorting criteria, participants appear to have imputed similar 
differences in the statements and generated similar differentiation criteria as expert raters. That 
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Familiar justifications were rated as containing more information/details than Know justifications 
fits with how these states are conceptualised.  Our definitions separate an absence of recollection 
from an unsubstantiated feeling of familiarity (Table 2).  Considering Know to be high-
confidence-without-recollection indicates an absence of information in memory – the word (from 
the study list) is in memory, but no associated thoughts or images come to mind, and this absence 
is sometimes reported in the justifications.  For example, Athlete “I am sure I saw it, but I can’t 
remember why I think I saw it”.  Based on this conceptualisation it follows that Know items 
should receive a low rating of how much information is in memory.   
In contrast, in reporting an unsubstantiated feeling of familiarity, other possible reasons for 
why something feels familiar are often reported; for example, Keg “It was a feeling that it was 
there.  I was not sure whether it was at work or here that I came across that word”.  Although the 
associated information mentioned does not help substantiate why the word feels familiar, its 
presence suggests that more has been retrieved from memory.  That amount of information 
recalled was identified as a difference between items (at least by half the participants) suggests 
that Know and Familiar subjective experiences may reflect differences in what information is 
retrieved from memory.    
As well as amount of information, confidence ratings also demonstrated an interaction with 
endorsement.  In previous studies, Know responses have been associated with higher confidence 
than Familiar responses in recognition experiments (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2009) and categorisation 
of others’ subjective experiences (Williams et al., 2013).  That participants who endorsed 
‘confidence’ as a criterion rated Know items as more confident than Familiar items fits with these 
findings.  However, participants who did not endorse confidence rated Familiar items as more 
confident than Know items.  This result is difficult to interpret.  It is possible that endorsement of 
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‘confidence’ may have been influenced by the criterion wording: “…the participants who made 
those statements must have been more confident in their memory performance…”.  The word 
“performance” here could have implied that instead of confidence about the content of memory, 
this criterion reflected confidence about how well the person thought they were doing on the 
memory test.   
The current findings do not support the single-process assertion that confidence is the sole 
driving force behind judgments of subjective experience (Dunn, 2008).  If recognition memory 
was best understood in terms of a single underlying process of confidence or memory strength 
then ratings of confidence should have more clearly differentiated the stimuli in this task.  Instead 
we have shown that participants used both confidence and amount of information/details reported 
in the justifications to differentiate the subjective experiences associated with Know and Familiar 
items
4
.  Our findings fit with the recent continuous dual-process model proposed by Wixted and 
colleagues.  As stated by Wixted and Mickes (2010): “The strength of memory and the content of 
memory are, in theory, separable and independent properties, but they often have been viewed as 
fundamentally incompatible ideas… the attempt to understand memory in terms of either strength 
or content is misplaced because both ideas are needed” (p. 1025).  In their initial continuous-dual 
process model Wixted and Mickes (2010) assumed that high-confidence Know responses were 
mainly based on familiarity processes.  However, a recent RK source-accuracy recall experiment 
led them to propose that high-confidence Know responses in recognition may be based on a recall-
like process (Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013).  This fits with the conceptualisation of 
Know responses as reflecting an experiential state of high-confidence-without-recollection 
employed here.  With the separation of Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess (RKFG) subjective 
experiences, both Remember and Know responses may result from a recollection-based retrieval 
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process – Remember responses resulting from successful recollection and Know responses 
resulting from unsuccessful recollection.  Meanwhile, Familiar and Guess responses may result 
from successful and unsuccessful familiarity-based processes respectively.  
Some experiments have already utilised separate categories of Know and Familiar, however 
the majority of these studies examined learning of rich materials over a longer time period 
(Conway et al., 1997; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2003, 2004).  It could be 
argued that conceptualising Knowing as a feeling of high-confidence-without-recollection and 
Familiarity as an unsubstantiated feeling of familiarity might not apply to more basic recognition 
paradigms.  However, Dewhurst et al.’s (2009) participants assigned 10% of items to Know and 
11% to Familiar at first test – a situation analogous to a single-time-point experiment.  Although 
their rare word definition stimuli were more complex than the unrelated words typically used in 
recognition experiments, these patterns suggest that the separation of Know and Familiar might be 
applicable to the subjective experiences associated with retrieval of other materials. 
One potential limitation to the study of states of awareness in memory is differences 
between experimenter and colloquial understanding of key terms.  As shown in Table 1, some 
researchers exchange ‘Know’ for ‘Familiar’ because of potential confusion between experimental 
and colloquial understanding of ‘know’.  However, as highlighted by Hintzman (2011), ‘familiar’ 
is also not without problems “Familiarity is routinely invoked in formal and informal explanations 
of memory as though it were a concept with obvious meaning, but the term appears to mean more 
than one thing” (p. 259; emphasis in original); and even ‘remember’ can refer to a variety of 
memory processes in everyday life (e.g., Migo et al., 2012).  McCabe and Geraci (2009) advocate 
the use of ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’ instead of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ as this removes any pre-
existing connotations that participants may hold.  However, with the separation of Know and 
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Familiar responses (alongside Guess), use of neutral terminology (e.g., Type A/B/C/D) would not 
be advantageous as the participant would have to remember which letter referred to which 
experiential state.  More importantly, use of neutral terminology may lead participants to interpret 
subjective states in a more linear (and therefore confidence-like) manner.  Instead, we suggest that 
the experiences associated with R/K/F/G responses are clearly defined to participants with 
examples and that manipulation checks are employed to ensure that participants have understood 
and used these categories correctly (Geraci et al., 2009; Migo et al., 2012).  We consider that for 
researchers specifically interested in examining retrieval processes and/or experiential states, use 
of the four response options of R/K/F/G will allow exploration of the complex and intricate 
relationships between source, confidence, and retrieval experiences.  For researchers using an RK 
paradigm to examine retrieval processes in relation to a specific task or stimuli use of the four 
response options may not be necessary, but we suggest that all researchers be more precise in their 
terminology – using either a Know response defined as a state of high-confidence-without-
recollection or a Familiar response defined as a feeling of familiarity – depending on the retrieval 
process that they are interested in. 
In conclusion, this novel approach to understanding experiential states found that 
participants correctly classified approximately two-thirds of Know and Familiar items but reported 
finding the items similar and the task somewhat difficult.  Although it may be more difficult to 
discern differences between Know and Familiar experiential states than, say, between these states 
and Remember, this does not mean that these subjective experiences should be encompassed in 
one response category.  At the very least, we should conclude that, given that something has not 
been remembered or recollected, when reporting subjective experience two distinct factors come 
to mind – confidence and amount of information in memory.  When participants had used these 
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factors to differentiate items, confidence was higher for Know items, whereas Familiar items were 
reported to include more information.   
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Table 1. 
Selected quotations detailing how non-recollective subjective experiences were described to 
participants.  Labels show: A – definitions often referred to in the literature as ‘standard 
definitions’; B – definitions that emphasize both familiarity and confidence; C – definitions that 
emphasize confidence; D – definitions that emphasize familiarity; E – justifications for using 
‘Familiar’ instead of ‘Know’ as a response option. 
Label Authors Response options 
in experiment 
Representative quote and/or definitions provided to 
participants 
A Gardiner and 
Java (1990) 
Remember 
Know 
“Often, when remembering a previous event or 
occurrence, we consciously recollect and become 
aware of aspects of the previous experience. At 
other times, we simply know that something has 
occurred before, but without being able consciously 
to recollect anything about its occurrence or what 
we experienced at the time.”  (p. 25, emphasis in 
original). 
A, C Rajaram (1993) Remember 
Know 
“‘Know’ responses should be made when you 
recognize that the word was in the study list but you 
cannot consciously recollect anything about its 
actual occurrence or what happened or what was 
experienced at the time of its occurrence. In other 
words, write ‘K’ (for ‘know’) when you are certain 
of recognizing the words but these words fail to 
evoke any specific conscious recollection from the 
study list.”  (p. 102, emphasis added) 
B Bastin and Van 
der Linden 
(2003) 
Remember 
Know 
Guess 
“…classify a ‘yes’ response… as ‘Know’ if you do 
not remember any information associated with the 
face. You are sure that you have seen it because you 
have a strong feeling of familiarity, but you do not 
remember any information encoded with the face” 
(p. 24, emphasis added). 
B Gardiner, Java, 
and Richardson-
Klavehn (1996) 
Remember 
Know 
Guess 
“The subjects were told that a know response meant 
that they knew for a fact that the word occurred in 
the study list, because the word was familiar in the 
experimental context, but they did not recollect it’s 
occurrence” (p.116, emphasis added). 
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B Kelley and 
Jacoby (1998) 
Remember 
Know 
“A Know response is defined as the inability to 
recollect any details of the study presentation in 
combination with a feeling of familiarity or 
certainty that the word was studied” (p. 134, 
emphasis added). 
C Geraci, McCabe, 
and Guillory 
(2009) 
Remember 
Know 
 
Experiment 1, confidence emphasized: “You should 
make a know judgment if you recognize the item 
from the study list, but you cannot consciously 
recollect anything about its actual occurrence or 
what happened or what was experienced at the time 
of its occurrence. In other words, write ‘know’ when 
you are certain that you recognize the item, but it 
fails to evoke any specific conscious recollection 
from the study list.”  (p. 707, emphasis added). 
Experiment 2, confidence not emphasized: “You 
should respond know, by writing ‘know’ on the 
blank, if you think the item was studied but you 
cannot recollect any details about the study event.”  
(p.708) 
D Dewhurst & 
Anderson (1999) 
Remember 
Know 
Guess 
“A know response is one in which you recognize the 
item because it feels familiar in this context, but you 
cannot recall its actual occurrence in the earlier 
phase of the experiment. You recognize the item 
purely on the basis of a feeling of familiarity” (p. 
667, emphasis added) 
E Donaldson, 
MacKenzie, and 
Underhill (1996) 
Remember  
Familiar 
“…familiar rather than know was used to indicate 
nonrecollection, because the word know carries a 
connotation of certainty that is inconsistent with a 
confidence rating that indicates lack of certainty. 
Participants find it hard to say that they are unsure 
that an item was there but that they know it was” (p. 
487, emphasis in original). 
E Harlow, 
MacKenzie, and 
Donaldson (2010) 
Recollect 
Familiar 
“Participants are trained to distinguish between 
familiarity and recollection (rather than the 
potentially misleading terms knowing and 
remembering)” (p. 1385, emphasis in original). 
E Ingram, Mickes, 
and Wixted 
(2011) 
Remember  
Familiar 
“…we exchanged know with familiar in an attempt 
to reduce confusion between the colloquial and 
experimental use of know” (p. 328; emphasis in 
original).  
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Table 2.   
Definitions of Knowing and Familiarity provided to participants at the end of the decision criteria 
questionnaire (left) and example stimuli statements (right).  For the definitions the instructions to 
participants were: “Below are two definitions that are typically provided to participants in memory 
experiments.  Participants would use these statements after they had responded YES – they did 
think a particular item had been on the list of items they had had to learn.  We are interested in 
whether these definitions fit with your definitions of Type A and Type B memory statements?”  
Participants identified which of their item types (A or B) fit with each definition (Know or 
Familiar). 
Subjective 
Experience 
Definition  Example Stimuli 
Know   For this item you simply Know that 
the item was on the previous list 
without any of the other feelings 
associated with vividly 
remembering that you have seen 
the item before.  For example, if 
you see someone on the street you 
may think ‘who is that? Oh yes, it’s 
my friend Rob, I know him really 
well…’ 
Hotel: It is one of the words I thought it was 
there yesterday, but there was no particular 
reason… 
Sea: It looked sort of as if I saw it, but there 
was nothing associated to it. 
Nun: I could not remember the situation but I 
knew I saw the word somewhere. 
Paper: It was as if I had seen it, I am sure it was 
there yesterday, but I cannot remember seeing 
it. 
Familiar   For this item you have a feeling of 
Familiarity with the item and 
because of that you think that the 
item was on the previous list.  For 
example, if you see someone on the 
street you may think ‘who is that? 
They look very familiar…  I don’t 
know where I know them from but 
they are definitely familiar…’” 
Professor: It was not in any of the little stories I 
made up to remember the words, but I had a 
strong feeling of familiarity. 
Butterfly: It was one of those words that rang a 
bell. 
Rectangle: I think I saw this word (but maybe it 
was triangle!), I do not remember visualising a 
rectangle but I saw it. 
Library: I think it came back to me but I cannot 
pinpoint actually seeing it. 
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Table 3.   
Decision criteria for statement sorting and the percentage of participants who endorsed each 
criterion. 
Decision criterion Percentage of participants who endorsed 
More sure 67.3% 
Recalled more information 55.1% 
Deeper level of processing 53.1% 
Confidence in memory performance 49.0% 
Visual imagery 40.8% 
Concrete words 36.7% 
Emotional language 26.5% 
Gut instinct 14.3% 
Abstract words 12.2% 
Mainly guessing 8.2% 
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Figure Captions:  
Figure 1.   
Mean ratings of level of information/amount of details recalled (A) and confidence in memory 
performance (B) split by whether the participant had endorsed ‘recalled more information’ or 
‘confidence’ as decision criteria.  Error bars show 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 We are grateful for John Gardiner’s permission to use these stimuli. 
2
 As one of Gardiner et al.’s (1998) participants did not provide two Know justifications, 
one Know statement was duplicated and included twice: Bluebell “I am sure about that one, there 
were a couple of words which were similar and were part of the category flower”. 
3
 A corresponding ANOVA comparing confidence ratings given to Know and Familiar 
justifications by participants who had or had not endorsed ‘more sure’ did not demonstrate 
significant main effects of endorsement or justification type and no significant interaction (all p > 
.25).  Although the means showed the same pattern as the ANOVA split by ‘confidence’, for 
‘more sure’ only 16 participants had not endorsed this criterion resulting in uneven group sizes for 
ANOVA. 
4
 Around 50% of participants also endorsed ‘more sure’ and ‘deeper level of processing’ as 
sorting criteria.  Although no follow-up questionnaire items examined these criteria, in line with 
our previous findings (Williams et al., 2013), endorsement of these criteria shows that when asked 
about the nature of others’ recognition memory, people use a variety of factors to differentiate 
categories of subjective experience.   
